In an article from last winter, Peter Calamai tackles the very pressing contemporary problem of the relationship between science and society. Specifically, he claims that getting the public to reason on the basis of our cutting-edge science faces challenges on a number of fronts. First off, the general public has only a relatively tenuous grasp on the main tool of the sciences themselves: mathematics. Our problems with numeracy, as a nation (though there is no comparative data to show whether this national problem is particularly acute in Canada or rather whether we're part of a global mathematical deficiency), stand between us and the scientific results that might help us in our lot as decision-makers.
Beyond this general weakness in mathematics, Calamai also mentions a general misunderstanding of the scientific process itself. Specifically cited as a culprit here, or at least an accomplice, is the way that scientists are portrayed in the media as very confident in their conclusions. Of course, to portray science more humbly, as the house of uncertainty that it really is, must be carried out carefully. Scientists are not simply bumbling about in the dark: there is always a degree of uncertainty, but along with that goes that very important correlate that evaluating confidence in conclusions is an immense part of the scientific enterprise itself. In short, while portraying scientists as forever unsure of outcomes would open up an easy target for skeptics, portraying them as very sure of the probabilities of outcomes would have quite a different effect. It's a bit of a trade off, of course: is it better to be someone certain about probabilities, or probable about certainties? The jury's out. But either way, it seems that the media's misrepresentation of scientists as always sure of a definite outcome does real scientists a disservice, because they (and present science) do not live up to that image.
So the general public is not only deficient in the language of science, but also in what kinds of results we can expect from scientific predictions. And whether to attack this problem in society through better schooling early in life, or through other public education later in life, is an open-ended problem. For what it's worth, I think that neither of those options alone is a viable solution. Humanistic scholars speak of a lifestyle of critical engagement; to assume that scientific education at one or another point in life is sufficient I think sells short the analogous point that science is not just a practice, it's a way of looking at the world, and one that needs to be fostered throughout one's life if one is going to use it effectively.
But are things so dire as all that? Are we really in such a bad way? Calamai cites Frank Graves, who says that while we might hope for scientific literacy to be better in Canada than it presently is, we shouldn't neglect the fact that we're trending upwards in scientific literacy. The public of course lags behind the cutting edge (and even specialists lag behind that cutting edge in other specialties, by the way), but we're still gaining ground, and that's a sign of improvement.
However, Graves also discusses the fact that the anti-science crowd (that's to say, the anti-vaccine movement, Young Earth Creationists, and the like) is gaining traction in the general public. This is anathema to science establishing itself as the thoroughbred in our decision-making stable. Graves points out that the reason these anti-science movements manage to win people over is that they appeal more directly to their practical concerns (and often their fears, which psychology teaches us is an easy and reliable motivator). They understand the target audience better, and therefore market their product more effectively, whether that product is in fact better or not. Graves very sagely points out that what we need here is not just a clearer restatement of scientific theories or predictions; what we need is a clearer connection to people's preexisting interests.
Malcolm Butler worries that the long-term outcome of this trend towards anti-science is that we risk "having the development of public policy drive not by fact but by hysteria." I believe that the root of the problem we face lies lies in the very opposition that Butler sets up here. If Graves is right that we need to better connect to people's values in order to reach them, and if anything beyond science (including those values) is treated as hysteria, with all of the dismissive judgment that a word like "hysteria" entails, then the scientific community has already foreclosed the possibility of reaching out. Simply put, a scientist is unlikely to connect with someone's values if they dismiss those values as hysteria. Scientists don't like having their ideas being dismissed by the broader public; it should come as no shock whatsoever that the inverse is also true.
Of course, not all scientists are dismissive in this way, but given that the generalization is already prevalent, scientists will need to work even harder to overcome it. But what work is that, exactly? Well, if you want to connect your theories to someone else's values, then you'll have to learn about those values. Scientists need a better understanding of their target audience if they wish to market they product more effectively, and that understanding requires a better grasp of humanistic inquiry, which seeks to understand the human animal in its cultural domain.
And to all those scientists who may have just read that last sentence about the importance of humanistic inquiry, and subsequently rolled their eyes, consider the relationship between scientists and politicians. Calamai himself notes somewhat disparagingly that the ears of politicians only perk up when the scientists start speaking their language, giving them insights into how to better disguise their politically motivated decisions as "science-based". Scientists disparage having their work taken up for purely instrumental reasons; I would press them to be consistent in applying that rule, and realize that for scientists to engage in humanistic inquiry for purely instrumental reasons, to be better equipped to convince people to use science in making decisions, is equally unacceptable. If scientists worry that the full benefit of their message gets lost on politicians because of merely instrumental interest, then they should recognize that the need for humanistic inquiry requires a full-blooded commitment on their part as well, lest something important be lost.
So what's the bottom line, here? What's the take-home message? The Canadian fluency in the language and process of scientific discovery is weak, which leads our citizenry to misuse an essential tool in decision-making. If we want to do a better job selling the importance of that tool, then we need to address people on their own terms and do a better job of connecting science to their own values. To do so, I argue that there needs to be a stronger bridge between the sciences and the humanities, one that exists not for the sole and instrumental purpose of convincing more people to be scientific in coming to decisions. This bridge, by the way, is not one-way, as ideas need to travel back and forth across it without being dismissed out of hand.
There are definitely institutional barriers to this discussion, and further barriers to making that discussion part of the public discourse. I won't address those here, but would love to hear some of your ideas in the comments section, for further discussion.
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